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finally, the few remaining warheads are neutralized as they
I~e-enter the atmosphere by interceptors and more beam
weapons. Mankind, through technology, has conquered his
-}
.
Relations between the United States and Soviet Union
have broken down over a serious crisis. Both sides are
unwilling to back down. Tensions are high allover the
world, leading to a military confrontation. In the Kremlin,
a fateful decision is made under heavy pressure. Missile
silos, the 20th century's "last argument of kings," open and
launch Armageddon into the skies.
But as the missiles climb, they begin to explode.
Laser beams penetrate and destroy the large boosters. Othe....
.
weapons destroy warheads as they separate from the "bus," or
as they fly through space over the North Pole. And
worst nightmare and triumphed.
This comforting picture of our homes and families being
finally safe from the horror of nuclear weapons has captured
the imagination of President Reagan, his administration, and
many Ame icans. The idea is so simple that it is presented
to the public in cartoon form: a "peace shield" designed to
prevent war not by threatening the other side, but by
letting them know that you are invulnerable to whatever they
.





and public opinion polls show a substantial majority support
the President's vision.1
This paper will examine the Strategic Defense
Initiative, or "Star Wars" ballistic missile defense. It
will examine the proposed multilayered system, its strengths
and weaknesses, and conclude with a discussion af the impact
SDI has had on strategic thought. It will try to answer the
fundamental question of whether the proposed BMD (ballistic
missile defense) will create a more secure and stable world
for the United States and its allies, or one less so filled
with "new hazards to the security of all."2 To put the
Strategic Defense Initiative into perspective, however,
requires first a short discussion of the history of
defensive systems against strategic nuclear attack.
Throughout history, as a weapon or tactic developed,
eventually a counterweapon or countertactic would develop.
Thus the pendulum swung between offense and defense. Since
the discovery of the awesomely destructive power of nuclear
weapons, there has been a seemingly permanent shift to the
offense, illustrated by the doctrine of Mutual Assured
Destruction (MAD>. MAD recognized that there was no
effective way'to prevent the delivery of nuclear weaponry
other than threat of doing likewise, and thus current
deterrence strategy was formed.
1.I<eith B. Payne, §trateqic Defense: "Star Wars" In
Pers.l2.§?ctive(Lanham: Hamilton Press, 1986), p. 237.
2 Franklin A. Long, "FoF"e\o'Jord"Weapons in Space (New York: W






Not that an effective defense against nuclear attack
had not been attempted. Both the United States and the
Soviet Union understandably tried various programs to defend
their respective homelands against the horrifying new power
of nuclear weapons. During the late 40's and most of the
50's, planners guarded against World War II style bombing
raids through systems of radars and coast watchers, and
Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs).3 Sputnik's launch on
October 4, 1957 by the Soviet Union forced the military
establishment to develop a defense against a new weapon, the
Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), capable of
reaching the United States from Soviet territory. The Nike
Zeus project was born in 1957, funded by a shocked Congress
and worried public. It was a system of radars and
interceptor missiles, designed for high altitude
interception of incoming warheads.4 It was tested
successfully on an Atlas missile but soon was scrapped.
The reasons for Nike Zeus' abandonment are worth
looking at. There were four basic reasons: the Soviets had
developed "penetration aids" inclL\ding "dummies," there were
increasing numbers of ballistic missiles on both sides,
radar and computer technology was advancing rapidly, and
3 Herbert F. York, "Nuclear Deterrence and the Military Uses
of Space" Weapons in Space. p 29.
4 Ale>:ander Fla:{, "Ballistic Missile Defense: Concepts and
History" Weapons in Space, p 34.
.
5 Ibid, P 35.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.






some politicians were concerned over the effect that ABM
deployment would have on the accelerating arms race.5
Nike Zeus was quickly replaced wit.h Nike "X" in 1963.
This new system of superfast interceptors (Sprint) was to
destroy warheads as they re-entered the atmosphere, when
decoys would burn up or slow down.6 The missiles were
targeted by new radars, called "phased array radars" (PARs)
that could simultaneously track the target, missile, and
discriminate between penetration aids.7 The purposes of
Ni ke
"X" ,were twofol d: to protect Mi nuteman si los agai nst
Soviet attack, and as a light area defense against a "third
country," like China, attack.8 Defense of cities against
.
Soviet attack had already been discarded as impossible,
because of the low altitudes at which the interceptor
detonated its nuclear warhead and thus cause substantial
destruction, and public pressure against having such obvious
targets near populated areas. A lesser BMD was also
preferred because it was less threatening to the Soviet
deterrent as an "offensive" system. Serious consideration
was not given to deployment until 1967, when the White House
pushed for deployment of Nike-"X" combined with a new high-
altitude interceptor called "Spartan."9 Combined with new
Perimeter Acquisition Radar (PAR) which combined long-range
surveillance with interceptor duties, the system was re-
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid, P 37.
13 Ibid, P 38.
.
named Sentinel, and was to guard cities from light, third
country attack. Public opposition to the deployment of
missiles with nuclear warheads in urban areas again stopped
deployment.l0 Then under Nixon, the system was
IIsub~:;tantially modified" into the Safeguard. Its duti e=-
were to include the selective protection of land-based
ICBMs, area defense against third country attack, and
accidental launch by any power.l1 The ABM treaty was signed
in 1972, and according to its provisions (which originally
allowed for two ABM sites, but was later reduced to one)
Safeguard was deployed operationally as a missile defense at
Grand Forks Air Force Base in 1975, but was phased out by
.
Congress the following year. 12 Serious United States' BMD
effort ended until it was resurrected in SDI form by
President Reagan in 1983.
ABM-l
The Soviet Union, always reluctant to acknowledge
vulnerability, pursued and still pursues a small BMD system.
Soviet BMD efforts were mostly unsuccessful until 1960, when
the SA-5, a long-range, high altitude interceptor was
created. Initial United States concern about the system was
high, but as more information became available its
effectiveness was questioned. 13 Galosh, called ABM-l in the
United States, was introduced in 1965, as another nuclear
.









complexes in 4 sites around Moscow, each with 16 launchers
and multiple, phased array radars. 14 It is thought to be
capable of defending a large area of the Western Soviet
Union. It remains the only deployed ABM system in existence
under the 1972 ABM treaty.
ABM-1 does not unduly worry United States strategists.
It Ci:\nbe overcome with chaff and other decoys, be "blacked
out" during an attack by nuclear e:.:plosions and thus have
its radars made useless, or simply be overcome by committing
over 100 missiles in a concentrated attack.15 Why do the
Soviets bother with it then? Aside from their refusal to
admit vulnerability, they may be guarding against third
country attack, protecting against accidental launch, or
using it as a nucleus for a future "breakout" of the ABM
treaty.16 This third purpose is of great concern to certain
elements in the United States, who fear a massive, sudden
deployment of a BMD system by the Soviets, and is often
cited as evidence of the need for SOl.
ABM systems on both sides quickly evolved from
defending cities and population to re-enforcing deterrence
by protecting missiles. Planners realized that it was far
simpler to add ICBM's in hardened silos, forcing the enemy
to devote two or more warheads per target, than to add to
and upgrade ABM systems. 17 BMD, in the form of silo-




combined with superhard silos, forcing the enemy to devote
many more missiles to each silo to be sure of a "kill." In
any event, serious consideration to defense of cities was
abandoned, until President Reagan's historic speech of March
23, 1983.
PI::;:ES IDEI'H REAGAN' S "\) I S I ON"
President Reagan called for a change in strategic
t.hought, away from "deterrence of aggression through the
promise of retaliation," and instead "count.er the awesome
Soviet. missile t.hreat with measures that are defensive. "18
President Reagan asked "would it not be better to save lives
t.han .:\venge them?" and looked t.o a ".future which offers
hope" where "free people could live secure in the knowledge
that their securit.y did not rest upon the threat of inst.ant
u.s. retaliation to deter a Soviet atta~k; that we could
int.ercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before
they reached our own soil or that of our allies."19 He
called on "the scientific community who gave us nuclear
weapons to turn their great talents to the cause of mankind
and world ~eace: to give us the means of rendering these
weapons impotent and obsolete. "20
THE STUDY TEAMS
Reagan commissioned three panels to study the
feasibility of his vision. One was the Defensive
18 Ronald Reagan, "Peace and National Secu,...ity,A New
Defense" (his speech of March 23, 1983) The Star Wars Debate
ed. Steven Anzovin (New York: The H. W. Wilson Co., 1986) pp
8-9.
19 Ibid, P 9.
20 I bid, P 10.
.Technologies Study Team, called the Fletcher panel after its
chair, James Fletcher.21 A second group. the Future
Security Strategy Study team, called the Hoffman panel after
its chair, Fred Hoffman, assessed the policy impact of
Reagan's BMD.22 A third panel, an interagency group called
the Miller panel also studied the effect of the defense on
NATO and the Soviets, but their report is unavailable as a
declassified version was never released.23 We will now turn
to an analysis of the Fletcher report as seen by a number of
experts, giving an overview of the concepts and technologies
required to provide an effective, multilayered, space and
ground based ballistic missile defense.
.
It must be kept in mind that the Fletcher report
appro.:\ch took "an optimistic view of newly emerging
technologies" in looking at the whole problem of a space-
based BMD.24 In other words, they assumed that the
multitude of technical problems could be overcome
eventually. While this fit in with President Reagan's "can
do" spirit, numerous purely technological and scientific
challenges stand in the way of a robust, multilayered BMD.
The concept of multiple layers is central to the whole
"star wars" system. The Fletcher panel realized that they
would be facing, in a worst-case scenario, possibly tens of
.
21 Donald L. Hafner, "Assessing the President's Vision: the
Fletcher, Miller, and Hoffman Panels" Weapons in Space. p
93.
22 Ibid, P 96..
23 Ibid.
24 Gerold Yonas, "The Strategic Defense Initiative" Weapons
ir! Space, p 88.
-<]
.
thousands of warheads and hundreds of thousands of decoys.25
The idea emerged that the BMD would be divided into four
layers, each destroying about 50% of the incoming missiles
and warheads. This would leave only a small (and no one
really knows how small) number of warheads reaching their
targets. Given the destructive power of nuclear weapons,
the question arises of \."Jhatconstitutes an "acceptable"
level of damage. If protection of cities and population is
the purpose, then "acceptable" levels will be very low. If
a BMD is .designed to protect hardened silos containing our
land-based deterrent, then the level is much higher.
ICBM flight can be divided into four phases. First
.
there i!:E.the "boost" phase where Iarge rockets accel erate
the missile to about 7 kilometers per second. In the post-
boost phase, the missile deploys its warheads and decoys
from the "bus" at the front of the missile. The longest
phase is the mid-course, as warheads and decoys follow a
ballistic trajectory through space. Finally comes the
terminal phase, when they re-enter the atmosphere and
detonate over target.26 The entire flight across the Arctic
covers roughly 10,000 kilometers and takes 25-30 minutes.27
Sub-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM's) go through the same
four phases, but have a substantially shorter flight time of
7 to 15 minutes.28
.
25 Ibid, P 80.
26 Hans A. Bethe, Jeffrey Boutwell, Richard L. Garwin, "BMD






HOW THE SYSTEM WOULD WORK- BOOST PHASE INTERCEPT
The first layer of the proposed defense would intercept
missiles in their "boost phase," almost as they come out of
the silos. This element of the defense is the most
important, for several reasons. When a booster is
destroyed, all the warheads or decoys on it (on an SS-18,
this can be as many as 20-30 warheads or 100 decoys) are
destroyed as well.29 Secondly, the Soviets would have no
idea of which ones would be destroyed, making a concentrated
attack on some target in the U. S. less certain.30
Advantages of boost phase intercept are twofold: a missile
booster is large and fragile, thus easily destroyed; and the
flame of the rocket makes targeting far easier.31
Because the earth is spherical (BMD would be far
easier if the world were flat>, to intercept ICBM's in the
boost phase requires that the weapons be positioned above
the Soviet Union. Obviously, this involves placing them in
space, in orbits of various heights, and makes the weapons
platform vulnerable to attack from inside the Soviet Union.
These new, space based BMD weapons would consist of the
latest in high technology, much of which has not been
developed yet. One of the central types of weapons
discussed are the Directed Energy Weapons (DEW) which focus
massive amounts of energy briefly on the missile or warhead,
29 Robert Jastrow, How To Make N~clear Weapons Obsolete,
(Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1985) p 102.
30 Ibid, P 101.
31 Bethe, Boutwell, Garwin, "BMD Technologies and Concepts






destr-oying it. Included in the DEW categor-y ar-e laser-s,
par-ticle beams, and "X-I'"'ay"lasers.32 Laser-s use a
concentr-ated beam of light to burn through the missile's
"sk in," damagi ng or- destroyi ng it. 3:3 A 1aser beam travel s
at the speed of light, so the weapon can be placed far from
the target and remain accurate, as long as it is pointed
accurately. It may also be bounced off a series of mirrors
from a ground or space-based station.
Particle beams
consist of particles like hydrogen ions acceler-ated to the
speed of light and fired at the target, where they penetr-ate
deeply, destroying the missile.34 Unlike lasers, par-ticle
beams cannot be used over great distances, because they ar-e
a.
9!(ffected by gravi ty. 35 Both 1asel'"'sand par-ticl e beams have
a difficult time penetrating atmosphere, especially cloud
cover. The final DEW, "X-ray" lasers, are e>:tr-emely
controversial. They are "powered" by a nuclear- e>:plosion,
pr"oclucing a "lazing" action in wires embedded in the
\.'Jeapon.36 This produces many beams of "X-rays" which are
highly destr-uctive. A single "X-ray" laser satellite could
potentially destroy several Soviet missiles.
However, "X-
r,,:-\ys"cannot be ti ghtl y focused and have to be Llsed from a
low orbit, and do not penetrate atmosphere, so they would
have to be Llsed in space.37 Furthermore, the Outer- Space
32 Payne, ~trateQic Defense, p 74.
33 Bethe, BOLltwell, Garwi n, IIBt'1DTechnol ogi es and Concepts
in the 1980's" p 61.
34 Ibid, P 62.
35 Ibid.




T~eaty of 1967 may fo~bid the placement "in o~bit a~ound the
Ea~th any objects ca~~yi ng nucl ea~ \o'Jeapons."38 As the "X-
~ay" lase~ is powe~ed by a nLlclea~ e:-:plosion, an a~gument
can be made that this weapon would violate the t~eaty, but
the exact meaning is ambiguous.
ABM weapon~y in space is not limited to DEW's.
Seve~al
p~ospective weapons systems involve "old fashioned"
p~ojectiles fi~ed at the missiles o~ wa~heads f~om o~bit.
Kinetic ene~gy kills missiles as effectively as it does men
o~ tanks. P~ojectiles accele~ated by ~ockets o~
elect~omagnetic ~ailguns would hit the ta~get with enough
fo~ce to dest~oy it.39 These weapons could fi~e ~egular
p~ojectiles o~ "sma~t" bullets which could stee~ themselves
tQwa~ds the ta~get, enhancing thei~ accu~acy.40 But
substantial hu~dles need to be ove~CQme in even these
simple~ weapons.41 A ~ecent study by a g~oup of physicists
pointed out that these weapons still need advanced lase~ and
senso~ technology fo~ pointing, t~acking etc.
The~e a~e seve~al ways the Soviets can counte~ these
weapons. They can sho~ten the dU~ation of the boost f~om
its cU~~ent 180 seconds, which is little enough time to
activate, aim, and fi~e a weapon, even using compute~s.
Using fast bU~n ~ockets, the boost phase could be ~educed to
38 Ab~am Chayes, Antonia Handle~ Chayes, Eliot Spitze~,
"Space "'Jeapons: The Legal Conte:o:t," ~eapons in Space. p 196.
39 Bethe, BOLltwell, Ga~wi n, "BMD Concepts and Technol ogi es
in the 1980's," p 62.
40 Jast~ow, ~ow To Make Nuclea~ Weapons Obsolete, p 92.
41 I bid, P 93.
- f L
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. 50 seconds.42 Warheads and decoys could be released while
still in the Earth's atmosphere, degrading the effectiveness
of "X-ray" lasers, particle beams, and kinetic energy
weapons. 43 ICBM's can be shielded against the effects of
lasers and particle beams through a variety of coatings or
be rotated to prevent the laser or beam from concentrating
on one spot in the skin. Alternatively the USSR could
simply build thousands of decoy ICBM's that would overwhelm
the defenses.44 Also, due to the satellites' low orbit,
position over the Soviet Union, and predictability, they are




The second layer of interception is the "post boost"
phase, where the warheads and decoys are fired from their
position on the "bus." This phase lasts from 2-5 minutes,
at a height of 100 to 1000 kilometers.46 During this phase,
there is still an advantage to the defense. Destroying one
"bus" also eliminates all the warheads it is carrying. The
weapon systems used would be the same as those for the boost
phase, however pointing and tracking is more difficult
because of the lack of the heat signature from the flame.
.
42 Bethe, Boutwell, Garwin,
in the 1980's," p 56.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Robert M. Bowman, Star Wars: A Defense
B~pst th~ Strateqic Defens~ Initiative.
Jeremy P. Tarcher, Inc., 1986), P 12.
46 Bethe, Boutwell, Garwin, "BMD Concepts








The simplest countermeasure to post-boost intercept for the
Soviets is to shorten the phase by releasing all the
warheads simultaneously, with a slight loss in warhead
accuracy.47 Again, attack against the satellite is another
possible countermeasure.
MID-COURSE PHASE
The next layer of defense would cover the mid-course
phase of warhead and decoy flight. This phase lasts 15-20
minutes (7-10 for SLBM's).48 The advantage here with the
defense i~ the amount of time available for the detection
and destruction of the warheads. However, the weapons must
be able to hit a relatively small target without any heat
signature to guide the weapon. The BMD must search for
targets, and discriminate between warheads and decoys.49
Discrimination is made difficult by thin atmosphere or the
vaccum of space, which makes objects of different mass move
similarly. The Soviets could deploy metal, radar disrupting
chaff or aerosol that would overwhelm the sensors.50 Even
more deviously, the Soviets might hide warheads inside
aluminum balloons, making them "look" like decoys to the
sensors.51
TERMINAL PHASE
The final phase of interception would occur in the










56 Ibid, P 60.
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penetrated the atmosphere. Target identification is no
longer a problem, as the atmosphere has slowed or burned up
decoys. 52 Also, the defense can choose which targets it
wishes to defend. Weapons used in this phase could include
traditional, nuclear tipped interceptors. However, new
technology allows for non-nuclear interceptors. One
promising interceptor of this type is the Homing Overlay,
successfully tested by the U.S. Army in June of 1984, when a
steel mesh projectile launched by a Minuteman booster
destroyed a dummy warhead at 150 kilometers.53 A second non
nuclear interceptor is the "swarmjet," which is basically a
gigantic shotgun shell that destroys incoming warheads with
.
thousands of small darts.54 Two possible countermeasures to
a terminal defense include making the warheads maneuverable
(MaRV"s) and thus able to avoid interception, and by
"salvage fusing" them.55 Salvage fusing causes the warhead
to detonate automatically when it senses an approaching
interceptor, or if it becomes the target of a laser beam.
Damage from even a high altitude burst of a large "city-
buster" warhead to populated areas makes terminal defense
against salvage fused weapons effective only for "hardened"






There are three levels of BMD deployment using these
weapons. Each would have different costs, risks, and would
require varying degrees of national commitment.
Reagan"s vision is of a "full" deployment, providing a more
or less "perfect" defense for the United States and NATO.
Potential high tech weaponry would be realized. Satellites
and ground stations would be integrated for maximum
protection of cities as well as ICBM's. This is an ideal
future held by the "true believers" of such groups as High
Frontier and many arch-conservatives such as Patrick
Buchannan. A step down from that would be a "limited" or
"partial" BMD. It would not be as e>:pensive as the "full"
deployment, but would not provide the degree of protection
of the ideal version. Its main purpose would be to provide
maximum protection of our retaliatory capability, thus
strengthening our deterrent against a Soviet first strike.
Some elements in the military see this as the most effective
use of BMD technology. Fin ally, t h er e i s the
"
s t r i c t I Y
limited" level. Perhaps this would consist of 100 Homing
Overlay interceptors or some other version conforming to the
limits of the 1972 ABM treaty. It would be used in case of
an accidental launch, or as a defense against a third
country attack. The protection it would provide our
deterrent is questionable. The implications of each of







Numerous technical obstacles will have to be overcome
for all but the lowest level of deployment. Technology that
needs to be created or improved includes sensors for target
detection, acquisition, discrimination, and kill assessment.
Weapons that will point, track, intercept and destroy
incoming missiles or warheads have to be developed.
Problems with deploying the system, and upgrading it after
it has been deployed, remain. The United State's capability
in putting cargoes into orbit at all has suffered serious
setbacks recently, most tragically illustrated by the
Challenqer explosion. Putting up a BMD may require
thousands of launches, and perhaps a new shuttle that could
transport heavier cargo loads.57 It would be cumbersome to
discuss all the technical problems, so this paper will
examine briefly one problem that has received considerable
attention: the computers and software that will manage the
system.
Because many of the weapons will be based in space, and
because of the quick reaction times (a matter of seconds)
needed for boost phase intercept, a space based BMD will
need to be run virtually entirely by computers. The
complexity of a system that will have to react to thousands
of objects and countermeasures, prevent itself from
accidental activation, and most importantly, work absolutely
57 John Tirman "The Politics of Star Wars" EIT!.Q.ty Promise:




perfectly the first time will be enormous. 58 The computer
system will require new hardware and an unprecedented type
of software.59 The hardware is a difficult problem, but
probably could be developed and tested. The software
problem is far more complex. The Fletcher report estimated
that the software would require 6 to 10 million lines of
code, while the Rome Air Development Center (which writes
air traffic control software) said 24.61 million lines, the
equivalent of one thousand thick textbooks.60
The time it would take to write this software would be
enormoLls. Air defense systems, air traffic control systems,
and the Safeguard software each required 500,000 lines of
.
code, plus twice that in support software for assembling,
testing, and verifying it.61 To design, develop, implement
and test each of these systems took "over one thousand man-
years of effort by professional staff over periods of up to
a decade...extrapolation may be misleading, however, as the
air defense, air traffic control, and ABM systems developed
in the 1960s and 1970s tracked only a few hundred objects
and made only tens of intercepts at a time. Our postulated
BMD system would have to track several tens of thousands of
objects and direct hundreds to thousands of intercepts."62
It must also have sufficient redundancies, backups, and be
.
58 Robert Zirkle, "A Tangled Nett-Jerk: Command and Control
for SDI," Em-R!;.yPromise, p 62.
59 Hafner, "Assessing the President's Vision," p 95.
60 Greg Nelson and David Redell, "Could We Trust the SDr
Software?" Empty Promise, p 94.
61 Charles A. Zraket, "Strategic Defense: A Systems




independent enough to withstand the loss of some satellites
and compensate for that loss. Those with computer
experience in the business world will tell you that rather
than say a system will not work as planned, the people
involved (and receiving the paychecks) will produce a less
than reliable system. The problem of fully testing the
system is central, for it has to work perfectly the first
time but because of its nature that cannot be done,
inevitably doubts will remain.63 The system will have to
sit in space for years without maintenance or testing, as
well.64
It will not be sitting in space alone, however. A
.
multitude of other satellites will be orbiting, plus the
refuse (thousands of pieces) of other launches. The BMD
must have safeguards against reacting against friendly
satellites that may wander into its area, and must also have
provisions for compensating for a satellite that may be lost
from collision with garbage or mechanical failure, without
activating itself as if an attack were underway. It must
also be able to defend itself from other, hostile
satellites.
ASATs AND BMD
ASATs and a BMD are inextricably linked. Because of
similarity of technology involved, even an ineffective BMD
would make an excellent ASAT, because of a satellite's slow,
.
6:<'Nel son and Redell, "Coul d We Trust the SDI Software?" p
106.
64 Zraket, "Strategic Defense" p 123.
.
predictable orbit.65 Consequently, in any kind of treaty
limiting a space-based BMD, the treaty would have to be
carefully written so an ASAT program would not serve as a
"stalking horse" for c~ Bi"1Dprogram.66 It is not within the
scope of this paper to discuss ASATs extensively, except as
they effect a BMD.
Much has been made of the Soviet ASAT, so we will take
a look at it. It is a massive (2000 kilograms), slow moving
device, that once launched circles the Earth until its orbit
matches that of its target, then its warhead explodes,
sending a hail of destructive pellets at the target.67 It
is effective only against satellites in low orbit, and is
.
limited in that it can only be launched from a few sites
when the target satellite is over the Soviet Union.68 The
proposed U. S. ASAT, on the other hand, is a small, fast two
stage device that can be launched from a plane as small as
an F-16.69 Future ASATs will probably be far more
effective, using DEWs and orbiting space mines.70 Work on
these types of weapons will probably be given increased
emphasis if satellite BMDs are developed, creating a tense
situation in space with destabilizing consequences.
Any space-based BMD will have to take ASATs into
account. Defending BMD satellites may involve hardening
.
65 I<urt Gottfried and Richard N. Lebow, "Anti-Satellite
Weapons: Weighing the Risks," Weapons in Space, p 153.
66 Union of Concerned Scientists, The Fallacy of Star Wars.
(New York: Vintage Books 1984), P 226.
67 Gottfried and Lebow "Anti Satellite Weapons," p 150.
68 Ibid, P 151.
69 Ibid, P 152.





them or making them maneuverable, providing them with
"escort" Ant i-ASATs (wh ich wi 11 in tLlrn be attacked by Anti-
Anti-ASATs, ad infinitum?) and putting replacement
satellites nearby in orbit or ready on the ground.71 One
element of Reagan's "vision" is the United States and Soviet
Union in peaceful coexistence, each with their own space-
ba:.ed BMD. Given the ASAT potential of BMD weapons, a
"satellite war" would not be impossible, and "star wars"
would become reality.
A SOVIET SDl?
One justification for the SDI is the Soviet exploration
into high technology BMD systems. A favorite tactic of
those who are alarmed by this is to create public concern
over a possible "BMD gap" or "window of vulner"ability."72
It is true that the Soviet Union maintains and upgrades the
only functional BMD system in the world, but it seems to be
doing so under the provisions of the 1972 ABM treaty. The
infamous and "blatantly illegal" Krasnoyarsk radar is cited
as evidence that the Soviet Union is going beyond the treaty
in its BMD, and is used as an argument for U. S. withdrawal
from it.73 While no reasonable explanation of the radar has
been given by the Soviets, the matter should be argued out
in the Standing Consultative Commission which has in the
past successfully resolved disputes over the ABM treaty, as
opposed to being used as a justification for anti-arms
71 Paul Stares, "U.S. and Soviet Military Space Programs,"
Weapons in S~ce, p 144.
72 Payne, ~trat~~c Defense. pp 48-49.
73 Ibid, P 165.
..
.
control rhetoric.74 Radar and tracking by their nature, are
ambiguous activities. Soviet breakout of the treaty seems
unlikely for they seem to value it, Krasnoyarsk aside, as a
means of preventing a costly BMD F"ace.75 As to the reports
that the Soviets are aggressively pursuing a high-tech BMD,
the United States even before SDI was initiated has
consistently been ahead of Soviet technology.76 Due to the
nature of the Soviet system, it would be possible for them
to secretl y resear"ch and bui 1d some sort of "breakout" BMD
system, but thanks to our own research into the area the
United States could counter it along lines similar to those
discussed above. High-tech BMD research is nothing new. The
United States has been keeping up with the technology to
prevent a Soviet "technological surprise," develop
countermeasures were the Soviets to deploy such a system,
and look for a breakthrough that would allow a system that
would truly be in the interest of U.S. national security.77
In any event, the threat posed by Krasnoyarsk is minimal:
there are no interceptors for it to guide (at least not
yet), it is only a small improvement on their existing
coverage (it "defends" a large, barren portion of Siberia
with a few military bases and missile fields along the
Trans-Siberian Railway) and it is vulnerable to attack.78
Careful analasis once it is completed will have to determine
74 Chayes, Chayes, Spitzer, "Space Weapons: The Legal
Context," p 212.
75 Tirman, "The Politics of Star Wars," p 27.
76 Ibid.
77 Bowman, ~t ar:-WaF"s, p 59.
78 I bid, P 67.
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whether it is innocuous or part of a nationwide
"battlemanagement" system.
COST / EXCHANGE RATIOS
The final part of the technological questions presented
in this paper is the so callf?d "bottom line." Defense
experts on both sides of ~he issue agree that it comes down
to the question: will it be cheaper for the Soviets to add a
new missile than for the U.S. to destroy it.79
Traditionally, the offense has been favored over- defense in
BMD systems.BO In the '60s, for every dollar spent by the
Soviet Union to enhance its penetration capability, the
United States has had to spend three to ten dollars to
.
counter that improvement.B1 Estimating the ratio is
impossible at this point, but it seems doubtful, given the
complexity and cost of the system, that maintaining it and
upgrading it would lead to a favorable ratio.
THE ULTIMATE COST OF A BMD
There is a second type of cost to the SDI program,
beyond just the bottom line on how many billions the system
requires. Money being spent on a BMD is money being taken
away from domestic needs or conventional forces.B2
The ultimate question with SDI comes down to: is there
a cheaper way to accomplish its mission? Gorbachev recently
has advocated destroying offensive forces rather than
~.._.._.......__....._---.._..__.._-...
.
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81 Bethe, Boutwell, Garwin "BMD Concepts and Technologies in
the 1.980'5," p 69.





building new "defensive" ones. Virtually no one believes
th~it SDI will be able t.o pr"ovide a "p€~rfect." defense (which
would be worth almost. any price), especially of targets such
as cities, so what will it accomplish? Protection of our
retaliatory capability which would thus increase its
det.errent value is the answer most often given.83 However,
there may be cheaper and more stabilizing ways of increasing
the deterrent value of our nuclear forces.
An e}:amp 1 e of
this is the "Midgetman" missile. It is a small, single
warhead ~CBM that could conceivably be "shuttled" around the
United States from silo to silo, forcing the Soviets to be
less sure of destroying U. S. ICBMs with a first strike.
"Midgetman" because of its single warhead would not be
considered the first strike threat that MX type missiles
are. Deterrence is reinforced because the Soviets would not
be sure of where they are, and would have to devote several
warheads to destroy one missile. Even more important is the
fact that it would be stabilizing, as opposed to a BMD,
which is inherently destabilizing. Thus we turn to the
second part of the paper, a space based BMD's effect on
strategic thought.
BMD AND STRATEGIC STABILITY
The most important question concerning the strategic
implications of a space-based BMD is whether it will
contribute to or hurt stability between the nuclear powers.




To do this, we need to examine the possible roles a BMD may
play (ranked in order of difficulty).84
1) F:epl aci ng "Mutual Assured Destructi on" \o'Jith
"Mutual Assured Suy-vival," in other words goi ng from an
offense dominated strategic situation to a defense dominated
one.
2) Limiting the damage to the United States, in
the event of nuclear war.
3) Defending against the "ragged" Soviet response
to a first strike by our nuclear forces.
4) Enhancing deterrence by reducing the
vulnerability of our ICBMs to a first strike by the Soviet
Union.
Even assuming all the technological hurdles will be
overcome, the first option seems to be a case of wishful
thinking. It also does not take into account the Soviet
Union's superiority in numbers of conventional forces. MAD
may be hard to live with psychologically, but it has kept
the peace through threat of nuclear escalation in Europe
for 40 years. A second threat to stability would occur
during the "transition phase" as the powers placed their
satellites. One side might feel that it had gained a
temporary advantage with a rapid, breakout type of
deployment and in a crisis situation be tempted to launch,
feeling that its BMD could handle the ragged and badly
coordinated response, while the opponent's BMD would not be




functioning fully yet.85 Even if BMD deployment were
simultaneous with offensive reductions, one side could
rapidly rebuild its offenses to gain a temporary advantage.
The second possible objective, that of damage
limitation, is also destabilizing. Here again, the defense
would be more effective against what is left of Soviet
forces after a first strike. This position would also mean
the end of MAD and entry into a "Io-Jarfight ing" strategy.
The Soviet Union would not sit idly by and let us build a
substantial BMD, they would probably build more missiles,
invest in their own BMD, or both. This would lead to a
costly, destabilizing arms race in both offensive and
defensive forces.
The third objective, that of "cleaning up" after a
United States first strike, has already been discussed
enough. While it would never be the stated policy of the U.
S. to use a BMD with a first strike, the Soviets would
undoubtably believe that the true purpose was offensive. In
any crisis, they would be tempted to launch their own first
strike under pressure to "use 'em or lose 'em." This
POSSibil~y might make the U. S. consider a preemptive
strike of its own. This viscious circle would make nuclear
war far more likely. The proposed BMD may have offensive
uses outside of ABM roles. Some have speculated that with
minor modifications, the weapons could destroy Soviet





planes, radar, or even missiles in silos.S6 The final
possibility, guarding our deterrent, is the hardest to argue
against. A secure second strike enhances deterrence and
stability. However, it can be argued that there are better
ways of protecting our deterrent than through an ABM.
Alternative basing systems and new weaponry like the
"Midgetman" are e:-:amples.
AF:MS CONTROL
If BMD is indeed a bad idea, for both technological and
strategic reasons, the systems should be denied to both
sides through treaty. It is worth looking at the 1972 ABM
treaty and SD! as it relates to the whole arms control
process. Arms control, assuming the treaties are fair,
reasonable, and verifiable is an inherently stabilizing
process.S7 Each side is aware of the other's capabilities,
(!..
reducing the chane of miscalculation and war.
~
The ABM
treaty is seen as stabilizing because it in effect codified
MAD, leaving the superpowers in a situation where the
populations of each side are hostages against attack by the
other.
Any kind of development of SD!, and probably some kinds
of research, put the ABM treaty in jeopardy.S8 SDI research
is a violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of the
treaty, especially if it involves testing. Article One
86 "Antimissile Weapon Spurs Debate On Potential for
Offensive Strikes," New York Times, 22 February 1987,
87 Bruce Russett, Prisoners of Insecurity, (New York:
Freeman and Co., 1983) P 170.
88 Chayes, Chayes, Spitzer, "Space Weapons: The Legal







states "each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for
a defense of the terri tol"'yof its country. "89 Even more
clearly, Article 'V states "each Party undertakes not to
develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are
sei:l.-based, ai r-based, E~.Q,~c(§L-q§\sed (emphasi s added) or- mobil e
land based. "90 Each side is limited to one (the original
treaty allowed for two, but this was reduced) ABM system,
with 100 interceptors and launchers, and a number of radars
to support the interceptors.91 With the possible exception
of the Krasnoyarsk radar, each side has lived up to the
treaty and it remains the only arms control treaty between
the U.S. and U.S.S.R. fully in effect.92
The SOl program seriously undermines that treaty,
according to the vast majority of experts. One of those is
Senator Sam Nunn, who presented an exhaustive, three day
study on the legality of SOl, and concluded that it is
illegal under the provisions of the treaty.93 The Reagan
administration (not known as a stickler for legality) has
attempted to "steer SOl through the gray areas of the ABM
treaty."94 Reagan's legal advisors claim in their
"reinterpretation" of the tr-eaty that the "purpose of the
ABM treaty was not to restrict ballistic missile defense per
89 ~e~~ons in Space, p 356.
90 Ibid, p 357.
91 Ibid.
92 Chayes, Chayes, Spitzer, "Space Weapons: The Legal
Conte>:t," p 197.
93 WTTW, Mcneill-Lehrer News Hour, "Star Wars," March 26,
1987.
94 Peter A. Clausen, "Transition Improbable: Arms Control




se, but only a particular ted"1nological approach to it. "95
They invited the Soviet Union to join them in this
reinterpretation, and pursue ABM development of their own.
The Soviet answer, for a variety of reasons, has been an
unequivocal "nyet."96 Several conservative and pro-SDI
voices urge Reagan to simply "cut the Gordian knot" (Pat
Bl.lchanrJan among them in hi s famous Newsweek "Testament II ) of
--'--'
the ABM treaty and withdraw.97
SDr affects the arms control process in more ways than
just deb~ting whether it conforms to the ABM treaty. Until
very recently, Soviet determination to halt testing of SDI
has been a major stumbling block at Reykjavik and Geneva.
The Soviets do not want any threats to land-based ICBM
deterrence, which they rely upon to a greater extent than
does the United States.98 Because of the Kremlin's evident
desire to reach an agreement banning space-based BMD, it may
be possible to negotiate a substantial new arms control or
reduction agreement on nuclear weapons.99 Several proposals
have been tabled by both sides, and the Reagan
administration's apparent commitment to SDI is the principal
obstacle to a new strategic agreement.
There will come a point in the near future where both
sides will have to discuss arms in space. Hopefully this
95 Ibid.
96 G. Arbatov, "Playing with Fire" (from Pravda), The Star
~ars De~ate. p 198.
97 Jastrow, How to Make Nuclear Weapons Obsolete. p 101.
98 Russet, fori son~rs of Insecur it y. P 185.
99 Payne, ?trateqic Defens~ p 144.
1) ABM treaty, no ASAT treaty (the status quo)
2) ASAT treaty and ABM treaty
3) f~SAT tr-eaty, no ABM treaty
4) No arms contr-ol in space
.
will result in some kind of treaty or treaties. Four future
situations are possible in ASAT-BMD negotiation: 100
With all these situations, the close relationship
between BMD and ASAT weapons must be remembered. The first
situation would be tense, for while ABMs in space would be
forbidden, ASATs with a dual ABM function could be placed in
orbit. Each side would be worried not only about its vital
communication and reconnaisance satellites, but also about
.
its deterrent. The second alternative would require
restraint by the superpowers to strictly limit or forbid an
ABM system and ASATs. Satellites are important targets, and
therefore tempting to each side"s military. Satellites play
an important dual role, they reassure each side through
ELINT (electronic intelligence) about the other"s military
activities, but they also can be used to search for and
target military assets. It is in the interest of both sides
to have secure satellites, "for in the nuclear age the
prevention of war must take precedence over the ability to
wage it efficiently."101 Treaties preventing the
development and deployment of ASATs, especially since they
.
are small enough to be carried by a fighter, will pose a
100 Carter, "The Relationship of ASAT and BMD Systems," pp
186-187.






challenge to verification. On the other hand, this option
is the least costly in terms of both money and stability.
The third alternative seems unlikely, that the U.S. would
withdraw from the ABM treaty and still negotiate an AS AT
treaty, even though it would be in the United States'
interest to have al nonthreatening environment to pursue its
ABM deployment. 102 The final possibility, no arms control
treaty in space, would lead to space being ASAT dominated,
and strategic warfare continuing to be offense dominated. 103
Any arms control in space will have to involve ASATs and BMD
for it to be meaningful.
Arms control in space should be a priority for the
United States. We rely on satellites for both civilian and
defense uses far more than the Soviets. 104 We should be
jumping at the chance to provide a secure regime in outer
space, rather than rejecting treaties out of hand because of
their threat to SDI.I05
Supporters of an ABM construct frightening pictures of
the Soviet Union in the future launching just a few
warheads, then threatening the United States with
destruction were the U.S. to retaliate. 106 It is hard to
believe that the cautious Soviet government would take such
an incredible risk, which would almost surely lead to
102 Carter,
187.
103 Ibid, P 188.
104 Stares, IOU.S.
138.
105 "Reagan Reported to Limit
York Times, 22 February 1987,
106 Payne, Strateqic Defense,
"The Relationship of ASAT and BMD Systems," p
and Soviet Military Space Programs," p






escalation and mutual annihilation. As to the a~gument that
we need a small system to guard against accidental o~ thi~d
count~y launch, it should be kept in mind that unless (and
even if) the BMD system is in compliance with the ABM
t~eaty, it could be viewed as a p~epa~ation fo~ upg~ade and
"br-eakout" of the t~eat y and the dep Ioyment of a Iarge seal e
nationwide defense. 107 The~e a~e othe~ methods of
p~eventing accidental use, such as p~oviding missiles with
self-dest~uct devices of the type used fo~ civilian
launc:hes. And the ~isk of a thi~d count~y attacking the
U.s., when it would su~ely by devastated by the ~esponse,
seems of a low orde~ of p~obability.
.
A CHANGE IN EMPHASIS - RAPID DEPLOYMENT
Already, the SOl prog~am seems to have been ~educed
f~om its o,,"iginal goals of making nuclea~ weapons "impotent
and obsolete." Some speak of SDI as being "impotent and
obsolete."108 In the push fo~ an ea~ly deployment, in a
p~obable attempt to c~eate a vested inte~est in BMD once
Reagan leaves office, emphasis has been taken f~om the high
technology weapons to kinetic: ene~gy ones that can be built
and deployed quickly.l09 Recently, the idea of immediate
deployment took a blow when the Ame~ican Physics Association
questioned the possibility of it. D~. Richa~d L. DeLaue~,
fo~me~ Unde~sec~eta~y of Defense du~ing Reagan's fi~st te~m,
.
107 Geo~ge Rathjens and Jack Ruina, "BMD and St~ategic
Instability," Weapons in Spac~ p 251.
108 John Ti~man, "Is Sta~ Wa~s Dead?" Empty P~omis~, p 204.
109 '''Star Wa~s' Push Dimming P~ospect Fo~ E:{otic A~ms," New
Yo~k Times 9 Ma~ch 1987, p 12.
.
said the purpose of the new direction in r-esearch was to
II'increase the survivability' of existing nuclear forces.
'It.s not an umbrella (protecting cities) and never will
be. '''110
CONCLUSIONS
Some good has come out of the billions of dollars
spent. We now have a stable of countermeasures to use
against a possible Soviet BMD, should they be foolish enough
to develop and deploy it.
In conclusion, the questions on SDI's technology
outnumber the answers. Many point to the Wright brothers,
and the Manhattan and Apollo projects as evidence that if
.
the United States puts enough resources into a problem,
anything can be accomplished.ll1 They point to the
"undistinguished history of technological skeptics
concerning many successful projects."112 But the scientists
involved in those endeavors were pitted against predictable
problems in physics, as opposed to a resourceful human
opponentl13. The moon was not varying its orbit in an
attempt to prevent the astronauts from landing. It should
also be remembered that the Manhattan project was supposed
to take two years to be completed, yet it took four.114 The
Apollo project came in ahead of schedule, but consumed 0.4
.
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111 Payne, ?trateqic Defense p 81.
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percent of the U.S. GNP between 1961-69.115 A perfect
defense seems very unlikely at this point, and SDI will
probably not fulfill the President's vision.
While we do not knew the answers to the technological
questions, especially the cost-exchange ratios, we can
predict the strategic consequences of a BMD. The "hair
trigger" ef a BMD, in terms of nervousness on the part of
the Soviets over the protection of their retaliatory
capability and the BMD's need to react quickly to a launch
or appro~ch of an ASAT makes for a very tense, unstable
situation. Finally, a BMD adds complexity to all the
calculations and considerations that go into strategic
decisionmaking, which is already incredibly complex. One of
the advantages of MAD is its relative simplicity.
A BMD is intellectually seductive for a number of
reasons, but the potential gain is heavily outweighed by the
accompanying loss of strategic stability. And there are
less expensive and more stabilizing ways of increasing the
effectiveness of our deterrent.
115 I bid, P 106.
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